MAX WEBER'S IDEAL TYPES: PATRİMONİALİSM, SULTANİSM, AND BUREAUCRACY

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ABSTRACT

This study deals with Max Weber's improved ideal types to understand authority and domination types. In order to understand traditional types of authorities, Weber constructed three types of ideal types; patriarchalism, patrimonialism and sultanism. These three traditional types of authority basically refer to personal relations between a ruler and ruled. However, the ideal type of rational-legal authority which Weber called Bureaucracy basically implies impersonal relationship between a ruler and ruled. These concepts also enable us for Weber to analyze the social institutions and origin of their differences in Western and Eastern countries.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma otorite ve hakimiyet biçimlerinin anlaşılması için Max Weber'in geliştirdiği ideal tipleri ele almaktadır. Weber geleneksel otorite biçimlerinin anlaşılması için üç tür ideal tip geliştirmiştir: patriyarkalizm, patrimonializm ve sultanizm. Otoritenin bu geleneksel tipleri yöneten ve yönetilen arasındaki kişiselci ilişkileri ima etmektedir Buna karşın Weber'in bürokrasi olarak isimlendirdiği akli yasal otoritenin ideal tipi temel olarak yöneten ve yönetilen arasındaki kişiselci olmayan ilişki biçimini ifade etmektedir. Weber'e göre bu kavramlar aynı zamanda Batı ve Doğu toplumlarındaki sosyal kurumları ve bunlar arasındaki farklılıkları analiz etmemizi mümkün kılmaktadır.

Max Weber's sociology aims to understand social relationships in terms of how individuals attribute meaning to their actions and to the actions of others to whom they are oriented in a meaningful manner. His sociology attempts to investigate how individuals are engaged in meaningful action with others (Weber, 1968: 1-4).

Weber constructed his ideal types, such as bureaucracy, patrimonialism and patriarchalism, in order to study social relationships and to offer causal analyses of their origin and unfolding. These conceptual instruments, in Weber's sociology, do not correspond to reality itself, nor do they depict an absolute truth. Because merely conceptual tools, they provide to us analytical constructs about social

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relationships only; they cannot capture empirical reality---which is, according to Weber, endless in an ontological sense (Weber, 1949: 89-93).

The problem of domination for Weber outlines one of the most important types of social action, namely, that which refers to authority relationships among individuals. The issue of dominance, for him, is not a matter of brute force, but of legitimacy. He wishes to understand how the obedient see authority as meaningfully "legitimate." Unlike its usage, for example, by Marx or Foucault, "domination" refers not only to coercion and force but also to compliance and a "belief in the legitimacy of authority." Weber distinguishes sharply between authority and power; only authority implies, to the obedient, legitimacy and constitutes domination or, in his term, "legitimate domination."

In order to address the main theme of this study, it is necessary first to explore major aspects of Weber's sociology and, in particular, his sociology of legitimate domination. Weber's writings on domination and legitimacy, and his ideal types to investigate those concepts, particularly patrimonialism, sultanism, and bureaucracy, will be examined in this chapter. Finally, this chapter examines, in broad terms, a number of differences between the West and the East as outlined by Weber in Economy and Society (1968).

a) Weber's Sociology

Weber's sociology, written 100 years ago, addressed the nature and major characteristics of social action and social relationships. He studied the causes and origins of relationships in comparative perspective in order to explain similarities and differences across various cases. He examined the emergence of, for example, modern bureaucracy in the West by investigating India and China, where this type of bureaucracy did not arise.

He considered individuals as important components of social relationships and as the interactive particulars within the social sphere, unlike Durkheim and Marx, the other founders of sociology. For Weber, persons, by attributing meanings to their, as well as other people's, actions, play an important role in social groups as well as in history. For him, "sociology...is a science concerning itself with the interpretative understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences" (Weber, 1968: 4).

Persons, for Weber, in other words, are active participants in social groupings who interpret the actions of others and attribute meaning to it. Weberian sociology focuses on social action in which people interpret each other's intentions and actions, and interact according to their interpretations (Weber, 1968: 22-24). Unlike other schools of sociology, the pattern of social relations is not pre-determined in Weberian sociology by a mode of production within which human beings are embedded (Marx) or by a collective consciousness (Durkheim).

However, interpretations of actions do not lead to social chaos and indeterminacies. For Weber, social action, in which people share in each other's actions and intentions, leads to durable and stable social spheres (domains, arenas) of life (such as religion, the economy, law, domination) and patterns of action; hence, the chaos and indeterminacies of infinite individualist interpretations develop into durable social relations: "Within the realm of social action certain empirical uniformities can be observed, that is, courses of action that are repeated by the actor or (simultaneously) occur among numerous actors since the subjective meaning is meant to be the same" (Weber, 1968: 29). Patterned social action that provides continuity to social life is evident even from his definition of "social action": "Action is 'social' insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course" (Weber, 1968: 4). The attachment by persons of meaning not only to their actions but also to other people's actions brings regularity to social life. Durkheim, in contrast, emphasized the normative aspect of society. For him, its moral values maintain society's cohesiveness and either the "collective consciousness" (mechanical solidarity) or division of labor (organic solidarity) upholds this moral character (Durkheim, 1973: 63-71).

Weber also emphasized the problem of meaning as central to the sociologist's approach to research. However, the complexity of empirical reality, he argues, is infinite, and hence researchers can never apprehend empirical reality itself. Analytical constructs ---ideal types--- must be formulated. These merely conceptual tools are "constructed as a heuristic device" to understand empirical reality (Weber, 1949: 95). Sociology, by utilizing ideal types, is oriented to generalizations and conceptual abstractions derived from various social and individual cases, unlike history which focuses on particular cases (Weber, 1968: 20).

In order to understand patterned social action that is meaningful for the social actor, Weber constructs "four types of social action." People may behave in a purposeful or goal-oriented manner (*zweckrational*) in which the means to attain goals are rationally chosen; or their action may be value-oriented (*wertrational*), namely an "orientation to an absolute value [and] involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of external success" (Weber, 1968: 24). Another type of action involves the emotions; behavior here involves affective action that depends on feelings rather than values or a means-end calculation. Finally, actors may act according to customs and conventions, or "traditionally." Emphasizing their continuity, they follow and imitate action as "it has always been" (Weber, 1968: 24-6). Through these ideal types, Weber attempts to understand how persons attach meaning to their actions, as well as to the action of others, and act accordingly. It can be said that he generally focused on the pluralism of causal forces behind social phenomena (Kalberg, 1994: 50). "Value-rational action," which always involves "commands" or "demands" that, to the actor, "are binding on him" (Weber, 1968: 25), is as effective as material and

political interests with respect to, for example, social change and the constitution of political domination.

b) Domination and Legitimacy in Weber's Sociology

As persons are not passive, or entirely obedient to the power or the commands of a ruler, according to Weber, the interactive aspects of social action are also important for the understanding of authority relationships. Weber approaches the constitution of authority as a problem of legitimacy; namely, how a durable political domination, as patterned social action, becomes understood as a meaningful, and therefore legitimate, relationship between a ruler and the ruled. Since authority is a type of social action in which the ruler and ruled interact with each other by attributing meaning to their interaction, authority is not founded on brute force or normative or functional determination; rather, its "compliance" includes an attribution of meaning to authority and to both a ruler's and subjects' understanding of legitimacy (Weber, 1968: 31-33).

Weber considered the problem of domination as the subjugation of someone's will to the control of another person. However, if to endure, domination cannot rest upon crude force; there is always a certain willingness to obey the authority by the subject. Rulership is not pre-given and natural within a society; instead it refers to the probability of this kind of relationship occurring (Weber, 1968: 943). In other words, authority requires legitimacy---which exists only with compliance. As authority cannot be established through force and compulsion alone, it includes at least "a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an *interest* (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience" (Weber, 1968: 212). Weber defines this compliance as "the belief in legitimacy" of an authority: "…custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination. In addition, there is a further element, the belief in legitimacy" (Weber, 1968: 213).

In Weberian sociology, the problem of how rulership emerges as legitimate is an historical as well as an empirical problem; it deserves to be investigated. The constitution of a "legitimate power," or an authority, the legitimization of the dominant regulations, and how people obey the commands of an authority---all of these themes present themselves as sociological problems. It is in this sense, even though there are other important themes in Weberian sociology (for example, the origin of the Western bureaucracy or the role of religion in the history of civilizations), that Albrow can contend that "political process, which is the making of social structure, is at the center of Weber's account of a science of the social" (Albrow, 1990: 175).

In addition to "the belief in the legitimacy" of an authority from a subject's perspective, the ruler always "attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy" or, as Weber puts it, a "claim for legitimacy" (Weber, 1968: 213). Legitimacy is not a one-sided event that appeals from the side of the subject

towards the authority, but also concerns the claimant of authority. The authority has to appeal to a legitimate ground such that the subjects' belief in legitimacy is cultivated.

According to a type of authority's legitimacy claim, "the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority" differ (Weber, 1968: 213). As we will see later, Weber classifies "the types of domination according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each" (Weber, 1968: 213).

From the subjects' perspective, for Weber, even though the authority's "command is accepted as a 'valid' norm," the motivations of the subjects vary when they obey those commands (Weber, 1968: 946). For him, this attribution refers to various motives, ranging from "a rational calculation of advantage" to "genuine acceptance" (Weber, 1968: 212). Weber also proposes that, like subjects, the obedience of the administrative staff varies "by custom, by affectual ties, by a purely material complex of interests, or by ideal (*wertrationale*) motives" in an authority (Weber, 1968: 212-13). However, whatever their motives, the administrative staff, like other subjects submitting to authority, believes in the legitimacy of the authority and complies with it (Weber, 1968: 212).

Depending on normative validity, namely, how the legitimacy claim of a ruler meets[1] the validity expectations of the subjects, Weber puts forward three "pure" types of legitimacy or authority. If an authority is based on impersonal principles seen as legal by people, Weber terms it "rational-legal authority"---hence (in a general sense) the legal system of modern society. In that case, the authority rests upon commands on "consciously made *rational* rules which may be either agreed upon or imposed from above" (Weber, 1968: 954; emphasis in original) and those commands are legitimated by impersonal norms. Hence, "obedience is … given to the norms rather than to the person" (Weber, 1968: 954).

On the other hand, traditional authority implies, for Weber, the superiority of the authority of a tradition over impersonal principles. In traditional authority, the commands are dependent on "the sacredness of tradition." Personal authority that represents tradition constitutes this type of authority (Weber, 1968: 954). On the other hand, charismatic authority is dependent on the authority of a person with an "exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character" (Weber: 1968; 215). In the charismatic type of authority, commands are legitimized by means of the unusual, extraordinary character of a hero, namely, the "belief in charisma" (Weber, 1968: 954).

Depending on the "pure" types of authority, Weber constructs "the 'pure' types of domination [that] correspond to these three possible types of legitimation" (Weber, 1968: 954). As he states:

[1] Since authority is a kind of social action, command and obedience to a command is a consequence of this "meeting" of meaningful interaction from two sides.

> *Rationally regulated* association within a structure of domination finds its expression in *bureaucracy*. *Traditionally* prescribed social action is typically represented by *patriarchalism*. The *charismatic* structure of domination rests upon individual authority which is based neither upon rational rules nor upon tradition. (Weber, 1968: 954; emphasis in original)

For Weber, in historical actuality these "pure" types can be seen as "combinations, mixtures, adaptations, or modifications" (Weber, 1968: 954). Sociologists, therefore, when utilizing a Weberian framework, analyze transitional forms and modifications in empirical historical cases. Thus, by applying the problem of domination in the Weberian sense to any social group, we will be able to analyze how the authority of a ruler finds legitimacy vis-à-vis his subjects in a particular type of domination. In this dissertation, we will attempt to analyze the Ottoman Empire in regard to the legitimacy of its rulership, as well as the ways in which its domination types changed over time. Did they approximate those developing in the modern West? In what ways did they diverge?

c) Traditional and Rational Types of Legitimate Authority

This dissertation will focus on traditional and rational types of legitimate domination. As mentioned earlier, for Weber, rational-legal authority puts forward impersonal rules and regulations as the grounds for legitimacy. Hence, if authority is dependent on impersonal regulations, it constitutes legal authority. In this type of legitimacy, "obedience (of subjects and administrative staff) is owed to the legally established impersonal order" (Weber, 1968: 212). However, "in the case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the *person* of the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is (within its sphere) bound by tradition" (Weber, 1968: 212). For Weber, within the bounds of traditional legitimacy, obedience turns into "a matter of personal loyalty" unlike the contractual relationship of legal-rational authority (Weber, 1968:212).

Subjects in the traditional type of authority, for Weber, do not obey impersonal rules and regulations, but customs and conventions formulated through long traditions and the persons who represent them. According to him, in the traditional type of authority, laws are not legitimized by legislation, but by traditions (Weber, 1968: 227). "Personal loyalty" instead of "impersonal duty" matters in an administrative staff and master relationship. Traditional authority, as Weber describes, brings forth personalistic master-dependent or subject relations rather than superior-inferior conduct within a hierarchy according to written codes (Weber, 1968: 226).

For Weber, this traditional type of legitimacy brings an unquestioned normative validity. The authority is seen as "legitimate" by virtue of the continuity of the practice. Neither subjects nor the ruler think of alternatives. Since tradition brings

unquestioned commands legitimized by tradition, personal authority involves traditional continuity. Subjects believe that a specific person represents the tradition. The ruler either obtains his position in a traditional way or he inherits it from a master, and his authority is recognized as legitimate according to tradition. For Weber, this person's commands are seen as legitimate in one of the following manners:

> ... a) partly in terms of traditions which themselves directly determine the content of the command [and] are believed to be valid within certain limits that cannot be overstepped without endangering the master's traditional status; b) partly in terms of the master's discretion in that sphere which tradition leaves open to him; this traditional prerogative rests primarily on the fact that the obligations of personal obedience tend to be essentially unlimited. (Weber, 1968: 227)

In terms of legitimacy by means of rational means, Weber saw impersonal norms, rules and regulations between ruler and subject. In this type of normative validity, regulations are put into practice through "contracts" or agreements, not by "loyalty ties." Weber argues that rational authority is dependent on the following criteria:

> 1. That any given legal norm may be established by agreement or by imposition, on grounds of expediency or value-rationality or both, with a claim to obedience at least on the part of the members of the organization... 2. That every body of law consists essentially in a consistent system of abstract rules which have normally been intentionally established... 3. That thus the typical person in authority, the "superior," is himself subject to an impersonal order by orienting his actions to it in his own dispositions and commands... 4. That the person who obeys authority does so, as it is usually stated, only in his capacity as a "member" of the organization and what he obeys is only "the law." (Weber, 1968: 216)

Rational-legal authority implies either imposed or mutually agreed upon impersonal rules and regulations opposed to the personalist sanctity of traditional authority. In this regard, it is contractual concerning both sides. As the difference of rational legitimacy from the traditional one, for Weber, legal authority brings us a "legally established impersonal order." The authority of the officers is not personal, but it originates from the "formal legality of their commands" which only work "within the scope of authority of the office" (Weber, 1968: 216).

For Weber, traditional and legal types of authorities imply their own "pure" types of domination. Traditional authority may be patriarchal, patrimonial, a feudal; rational-legal type authority involves the bureaucracy. However, as mentioned

earlier, for Weber, empirically we observe a mixture of these ideal types in societies.

d) The Ideal Types of Traditional Authority: Patriarchalism, Patrimonialism, and Sultanism

In Economy and Society (1968) Weber starts the discussion of the ideal type of traditional authority with an analysis of patriarchalism. This type of authority is located in households and constitutes the elementary type of domination. There is no administrative staff between the ruler and his subjects. They depend on each other's traditional action-orientations and there is no mediation between them; "the master is still largely dependent upon the willingness of the members to comply with his orders since he has no machinery to enforce" his will (Weber, 1968: 231). In addition, there is no formality among household members and they are related to each other by family ties, i.e., kinship-blood relations. Weber uses the term *oikos*-household[2] to describe these family ties (Weber, 1968: 1010). Their relations with each other depend on community and loyalty ties, not upon a mutually agreed contract.

Unlike patriarchalism, which is founded in the household and lacks an administrative staff, patrimonialism refers to an extended household with new members. It involves extended land-holdings by a ruler, and the settlement of dependents and equipment on plots of land (Weber, 1968: 1010). However, the patrimonial state is still founded on kinship roots, as it is an extended or decentralized form of patriarchalism. Whereas patriarchalism is limited to one family and one household, patrimonialism involves an extension of this household on the basis of land-holding assignments to new dependents (Weber, 1968: 1011). "At first," patrimonialism for Weber, "is only a decentralization of the household when the lord settles dependents (including young men regarded as family members) on plots within his extended land-holdings, with a house and family of their own, and provides them with animals (therefore: *peculium*) and equipment" (Weber, 1968: 1010). Despite the extension of the household to new dependents, household informality and the master's paternal power continues in patrimonialism, as "there are originally no consociations in the form of binding contacts between masters and dependents" (Weber, 1968: 1010).

Importantly, patrimonialism also involves professional administrators of the ruler's territories. If the ruler searches for maximum personal authority, he is "always in need of a *body of officials*" and "an organized administration, and hence a suitable division of functions" (Weber, 1968: 1025; Weber's italics). This "professional" administrative apparatus is supported by slaves, mercenary bodyguards or patrimonial troops, which are directly under the control of the ruler. This means that authority is no longer dependent on the willingness of the subjects, as is the

[2] "*Oikonomia* in Greek means the management of such a household, from this word we derive the English word "economy" " (Frost, 1987: 21).

case in its elementary form, patriarchalism. However, it is under the direct control of the ruler and guaranteed by his loyal soldiers. This type of authority implies arbitrariness of personal power by the ruler, as it is not codified and controlled by a code or impersonal regulations. In this case, the officialdom of patrimonial officials "is based not on the official's commitment to an impersonal purpose and not on obedience to abstract norms, but on strictly personal loyalty" (Weber, 1968: 1006).

In the case of patrimonialism, this administrative apparatus is considered to be a personal possession of the master (1968: 232). Therefore, in Weber's assessment, patrimonialism implies a personal dependence between the ruler and his subjects and depends on ties of loyalty. Patrimonialism is not based on abstract rules and regulations but on personal loyalty and fidelity. In this regard, patrimonialism depends on traditional authority, and the patrimonial ruler personally controls the administrative military apparatus (Weber, 1968: 231). Hence, patrimonialism brings "force" and "compulsion" to the household and the administrative staff has certain privileges in respect to domination. To Weber: "they do not execute their duties according to rules and regulations but '*ad hoc* decisions, favors, privileges, personal connections' " (Weber, 1968: 1041).

For Weber, since a patrimonial ruler personally controls the administrative and military apparatus, or they are his "personal instruments," he is only responsible to tradition, not to any impersonal written document and this gives him arbitrariness in respect to his personal power (Weber, 1968: 231). However, the authority of the patrimonial ruler over his subjects is not absolute as the real ground of his legitimacy is based not on himself, but on tradition.[3] The "master" is always constrained by the norms of tradition he is piously related to (Weber, 1968: 1008). The tie, which maintains the relation between the master and his subject, is not a rational approval of means and ends or common values shared by two parties, but habituation and tradition which "in fact limits the master's discretion" and keeps the subjects loyal to their master (1968: 1011). The ruler's acts are legitimate as long as he complies with the tradition. Hence, for Weber, patrimonialism refers to "a consensual community which is rooted in the belief that the ruler's powers are legitimate insofar as they are *traditional*" (Weber, 1968: 1020). Because of the subjects' belief that the patrimonial master has a right to rule, these "political subjects" are "legitimately ruled by a patrimonial prince" (1968: 1020). As Weber states:

> Under patrimonial domination the legitimacy of a master's orders is guaranteed by personal subjection, only the fact and the limits of his power of control are derived from "norms", yet these norms are not enacted but sanctified by tradition. The

3 This makes patrimonial domination different from charismatic domination, in which the charismatic ruler does not recognize a loyalty requirement to tradition.

> fact that this concrete master is indeed their ruler is always uppermost on the minds of his subjects. (Weber, 1968: 1006)

This tradition in subjects' minds brings with it sanctity and legitimacy. For them, tradition is sacred without temporal limits and it prescribes loyalty to the political ruler, as he symbolizes the stability and continuity of existing norms and institutions. In this type of domination, there is no distinct legislative office, which supervises or regulates legal documents, procedures, enactments, or execution of laws. In other words, "legal decisions as 'finding of the law' (*Rechtsfindung*) can refer only to documents of tradition, namely to precedents and earlier decisions" (Weber, 1968: 227).

On the other hand, despite the ruler's arbitrary power that is claimed as legitimate by means of loyalty to tradition, a broad extension of the household makes the master dependent "upon his subjects' compliance and always upon their capacity to deliver rent in kind" (Weber, 1968: 1010). The master has to satisfy the needs and expectations of his newly adopted household in order to keep them loyal. These needs are usually comprised of protection from external enemies and kindly treatment that excludes exorbitant taxation (Weber, 1968: 1010). A retainer usually receives one of the following benefits for his services "a) by living from the lord's table b) by allowances (usually in kind) from the lord's magazines or treasury c) by rights of land use if return for services ('service-land'), d) by the appropriation of property income, fees or taxes e) by fiefs" (Weber: 1968: 235). In turn, the subject supports his master by "freeing the master from debt, providing a dowry for his daughters or ransoming him from captivity" (Weber, 1968: 1011). During warfare, "he serves as page, coachman, carrier of arms, camp-follower---as in the knightly armies of the Middle Ages---or as a private fully equipped warrior of his master" (Weber, 1968: 1011). On the other hand, "in the patrimonial state the most fundamental obligation of the subjects is the material maintenance of the ruler" (Weber, 1968: 1014).

As mentioned earlier, the patrimonial ruler needs professional administrators and this may lead to the development of a bureaucratic administrative foundation with technicalization and a bureaucratic staff (Weber, 1968: 1028). Hence, patrimonialism has a tendency "toward a rational bureaucratic administration, which resorts to systematic taxation" due to "financial rationalization" (Weber, 1968: 1014). Since collegiality and favoritism obstructs the efficiency in this system as administrative staff are expected to take their positions according to their technical qualifications rather than to personal affiliations, the administrative system and its officials are taken under the authority of a Prime Minister to ensure their administrative efficiency. Prime Ministers execute the bureaucratic organ of the state in the name of the ruler (Weber, 1968: 280). In the Near Eastern-Persian political tradition, this executive person, the Grand *Vezir*, rules the government and he uses his power under the authority of the ruler-*Shah*. This kind of administrative arrangement protects the patrimonial ruler's dignity before the

public, which finds itself in "the formula: *le roi règne, mais il ne governe pas*" (the king rules, but does not govern) (Weber, 1968: 1147).

However, the personalism of the patrimonial master is weakened by the rules of financial regulations and bureaucratic technicalization. The development of the money economy carries a depersonalization effect. A lord may start tax farming for the sake of more efficient taxation; he may sell offices during warfare, or for debt payments. Those changes in the usage of economic resources and offices lead to a decline of personalist control over subjects, economic sources and offices (1968: 965-66). In addition, a "service law," which guarantees rights and privileges of officials, strengthens the autonomy of this administrative staff (Weber, 1968: 1027). They may form an autonomous group closed to extra-group members and may set up their own rules and regulations independent of the patrimonial ruler. He tries to prevent this kind of monopolization and autonomy by "appointing hereditary personal dependents or aliens who are completely dependent on him" (Weber, 1968: 1027).

For Max Weber, within the patrimonial state "the two powers which we consider specifically political---military and judicial authority---are exercised without any restraint by the master as components of his patrimonial power" (Weber, 1968: 1013). The patrimonial ruler has authority over the judicial system and guarantees the durability of this system with a military force loyal to him. In patrimonial states, the military force may depend on slaves, mercenaries, granted landlords, or allied professional warriors who have common interests with the ruler.

This personal authority in some cases, such as in the Near Eastern states, is solidified by spiritual power assigned to the ruler, who is then regarded as divine by his subjects. Weber refers to this type of authority as "sultanism":

> Where domination is primarily traditional, even though it is exercised by virtue of the ruler's personal autonomy, it will be called patrimonial authority; where it indeed operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called sultanism. The transition is definitely continuous. Both forms of domination are distinguished from elementary patriarchalism by the presence of a personal staff. (Weber, 1968:232)

For Weber, since sultanic authority implies a distinguished personality, it "is completely unrestrained by tradition" (Weber, 1968: 232). This increases the arbitrariness of the ruler's power. His authority reaches beyond the limits of tradition as his personality achieves a divine character. In the sultanic form of authority, the ruler's personal authority reaches its maximum level within patrimonial domination (Weber, 1968: 232). For Weber, the Oriental patrimonial ruler himself had a "military power position" not just an army loyal to himself, which makes his replacement more difficult. It is almost impossible to challenge a sultan (Weber, 1968: 1028).

Despite the arbitrary relation between the ruler and his subjects in the Orient, the vassalage system of Occidental feudalism brings about a kind of contract between a lord and his vassal "which was shaped by a code of honor binding upon both parties" (Weber, 1968: 1074). This contract-like typification of obligations does not exist in Oriental patrimonialism or sultanism: "the Turkish feudal system remained much more prebendal with regard to claims of inheritance, since the power of Sultan and the *beglerbeg* continued to be largely arbitrary despite all of the rules and regulations" (Weber, 1968: 1074).[4]

e) The Ideal Type of Rational-Legal Authority: Bureaucracy

For Weber, like other types of authorities, the rational type of legitimacy brings its own ideal type: bureaucracy. In his words: "the purest type of exercise of legal authority is that which employs a bureaucratic administrative staff" (Weber, 1968: 220). According to Weber, depending on rational-legal legitimacy, "bureaucracy has a "rational" character" as it works "with rules, means-end calculus, and matter-of-factness..." (Weber, 1968: 1002). In addition, those impersonal rules, regulations and norms provide the ground for the legitimacy of this type of domination. Hence, bureaucracy eliminates the sanctity of tradition by proposing the "compliance with rationally determined rules and by the knowledge that these rules can be superseded by others, if one has the necessary power, and hence are not sacred" (Weber, 1968: 1117).

This legal authority is applied in given political domination by "an administrative staff that is most unambiguously a structure of domination, 'officialdom' or 'bureaucracy'" (Weber, 1968: 219). Opposed to the personalist loyalty of patrimonialism, which is based on traditional legitimacy, bureaucracy works according to abstract impersonal rules, which usually take a written form, on the ground of a rational- legal type of domination. Instead of the personalist authority of traditional legitimacy, these abstract rules bring about an impersonal order, which binds everybody without an exception and privilege. People, who execute those laws, do not put forward their personal authorities.

For Weber, "bureaucracy ... is fully developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern state, and in the private economy only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism" (Weber, 1968: 956). In his view, in some historical cases, like that of the Mongols or the ancient Orientals, we can see "a fixed jurisdiction." However, even in those cases there is always a strong non-bureaucratic element, namely dependence of subjects upon the ruler (Weber, 1968: 956). For Weber, the emergence of a bureaucracy, a machine-like human organization working with impersonal juridical regulations, starts with the modern epoch in Europe.

According to him, the major characteristics of the modern bureaucracy are:

[4] Weber's further prominent type of traditional authority, feudalism, is omitted here. It is of little significance to our case, the Ottoman Empire.

1. Offices are run by rules and regulations; persons employed in offices, work within these rules and regulations and personal initiative is constrained according to them.
2. There is an office-hierarchy in which lower offices are subordinate to higher offices.
3. Those rules and regulations by which offices are run are preserved in a "written form."
4. Specialization is achieved through training.
5. A bureaucrat's job is a professional obligation rather than a secondary duty, and he/she is supposed to work at "full working capacity".
6. The rules and principles that govern the management of the office are available for everybody to learn. They are general, not secret or abstractly defined, and can be possessed by anyone without regard to personal favor or privilege (Weber, 1968: 958).

These characteristics show us that Weber saw bureaucracy as a kind of machine that functions in accord with general, abstract-formal rules and regulations, and without consideration of features or favors given to individuals. Officials working in this machine, even those in higher ranks, should obey the written, abstract rules. This administrative staff in a bureaucracy is constituted from professionals who are "completely separated from ownership of the means of production or administration" (Weber, 1968: 218); they are assigned according to their technical qualifications and "remunerated by fixed salaries in money" (Weber, 1968: 220). Rules and decisions are recorded in writing. This central feature distinguishes the bureaucracy from all traditional forms of rulership, all of which connect authority to persons rather than to officers. Bureaucracy in its modern sense, "does not establish a relationship to a *person*, like the vassal's or disciple's faith under feudal or patrimonial authority, but rather is devoted to *impersonal* and *functional* purposes" (Weber, 1968: 959, Weber's italics). With its impersonalism and rational means-ends calculability, bureaucracy provides predictability.

"Bureaucratization" for Weber "offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations." It works through "objective" ways that imply "calculable rules" and their application "without regard for persons." Bureaucracy also implies, because it eliminates "from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation," dehumanization (Weber, 1968: 975). A bureaucrat, an officer in the bureaucracy, performs his work as a "duty" (*Pflicht*) not because of service for a fief, or benefit or loyalty to a master; and office work is not done in return for specific services or benefits, as in the Middle Ages. "Rather", for Weber, "entrance into an office, including one in the private economy, is considered as acceptance of a specific

duty of fealty to the purpose of the office (*Amtsreue*) in return for the grant of a secure existence" (Weber, 1968: 959).

For Weber, the development of a money economy accompanies the development of bureaucracy, as it provides regular, fixed salaries instead of fiefs and benefices (1968: 963). A fixed salary, which is determined according to status, is paid according to rank or function. Since it does not change according to "work done," it maintains the relationship between a bureaucrat and his superior as formal and impersonal (1968: 963). A functionary's salary, status, function, and duty are comparable to his colleagues, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Hence, the development of the money economy brings a depersonalization effect. Rules and regulations typical of the money economy loosens personalist control of the master over economic means and administrative systems and paves the way for bureaucratization, which implies protocols and coded behaviors in social interaction. The administrative system is kept in accord with economic regulations, for the sake of efficiency and productivity, through technicalization, professionalization, and the master's dependency on an expert staff. For Weber, "'equality before the law' and the demand for legal guarantees against arbitrariness demand a formal and rational 'objectivity' of administration, as opposed to the personal discretion flowing from the 'grace' of the old patrimonial domination" (Weber, 1968: 979).

The money economy and marketization brings about a contract between the ruler and his subjects based on interest relations and the idea of the rule of law instead of personalism and loyalty. Whereas the coming of rules and regulations in an economy and administration prepares for the advance of bureaucratization, the impersonal features of the bureaucracy control the personalist regime of the lord over his direct rulership over subjects. "The leveling of economic and social differences," which "accompanies modern *mass democracy*," eliminates privilege and nobility ties (Weber, 1968: 983; emphasis in original). Individuals are regarded as equals, rather than in terms of privileges, and "case to case" evaluations are replaced with standard-abstract regulations, "which is a result of the demand for "equality before the law" in the personal and functional sense" (Weber, 1968: 983).

The impersonal characteristic of the bureaucracy makes administration belong to nobody. Since bureaucracy is not under the authority or ownership of a specific person and is a machine-like administrative tool, it can work under anybody's control and authority and it can change hands. Weber states that:

> The objective indispensability of the once-existing apparatus, in connection with its peculiarly "impersonal" character, means that the mechanism-in contrast to the feudal order based upon personal loyalty-is easily made to work for anybody who knows how to gain control over it. (Weber, 1968: 987)

That is why, after occupation, an enemy can easily rule the country by only changing the top officials and keeping the bureaucratic machine in action (Weber, 1968: 987).

On the other hand, the specialization and technical superiority of a bureaucracy makes the ruler dependent on the organization. Since bureaucracy's rulership is rooted in its efficiency, a monarch's relation to the bureaucracy is reduced to "communication with the bureaucratic chiefs which is methodically planned and directed by the central head of the bureaucracy" (Weber, 1968: 993).

Since the administrative tool in a patrimonial type of authority always includes bureaucratic features, these interchangeable patrimonial and bureaucratic characteristics in patrimonial regimes may create political tensions due to their contending legitimacy grounds. We can observe these kinds of tensions in various examples in history: Ancient Egypt, the Roman Empire, and even in the great revolutions, such as the French Revolution. In the following chapters, we will examine this tension between patrimonial and bureaucratic types of domination in the case of the Ottoman Empire.

f) Isolating the West *vis-à-vis* the East

Weber attempted to outline the reasons behind the differences between the West and the East in order to assess why "modern Western rationalism"---mainly, modern Western capitalism, modern bureaucracy and modern law--- emerged in the West and not in the East. This section will address several main points he thought significant in this regard. It will examine the Ottoman Empire's bureaucratization and patrimonialism in terms of Weber's consideration of it as Eastern and the reasons why, to him, the Empire never became bureaucratic; on the contrary, it remained patrimonial.

Weber studied Western and Eastern civilizations in reference to arrays of ideal-types; he then compared them in order to isolate the similarities and differences. For him, the emergence of the bureaucratic type of authority was unique to the West. He sees the originality of Western bureaucratic rulership and its divergence, in various ways, from Eastern patrimonialism. Legacies of the Roman Empire in Europe, for example, proved central in this respect.

For him, Roman law was formalistic; it reduced all legal issues to "the most elementary logical constituents: one lawsuit for just one issue; one legal transaction for just one object; one promise for just one performance..." (Weber, 1968: 796). The Roman Empire also recognized, with Roman law's concept of corporation, the legal rights of official institutions. For Weber, the concept of corporation, as it originated in Europe, separated individual rights from the rights of the collective: "the absolute separation of the municipal property from that of the individuals was as self-evident as the maxim: *quod universitati debetur singulus non debetur* [That which is owed to the collective is not owed to its members]" (Weber, 1968: 715). Originally used by municipal magistrates, the concept of corporation and its legal

protection was also exercised in private corporations in Europe (Weber, 1968: 715).

Weber also emphasizes the importance of the Occidental city, which uniquely maintained the autonomy of law vis-à-vis the political authority. For Weber, emerging during the medieval period of Europe, the Occidental city manifests one of the unique aspects of Western civilization. Occidental cities, such as Genoa and Cologne, were based on the autonomy of artisan craft-guilds and an autonomous body of laws that regulated them. For Weber, "the main *legal* achievement of the urban revolutions was the creation of a special trial procedure which excluded irrational means of evidence and in particular the test by duel (this is mentioned in many eleventh century privileges)" (Weber, 1968: 1254; emphasis in original). Started in urban communes, French and British crowns granted the same rights for "burghers"; that is, persons with rights living in cities. The recognition of subject-citizen rights brought about "the codification of a special rational law for urban citizens which the court of the consuls was to apply" (Weber, 1968: 1254).

In the Occidental city, individuals were considered to be bound under a contract[5] rather than through kinship or other blood-related ties, and they were able to buy their freedom through monetary payments. Moreover, the Occidental city protected the rights of its burghers, an achievement of the Occidental cities not found in other places (Weber: 1968: 1238). In addition, these cities enabled burghers to participate in politics through the election of the city councils rather than through appointments by the city lord (Weber, 1968: 1253). Therefore, "only in the Occident did the election of the ruler gradually develop into the representative system" (Weber, 1968: 1127).

For Weber, only the cities in the West had the idea of this "commune," which endowed their inhabitants with "a special status in the political-administrative sense" (Weber, 1968: 1226). This never took place in other areas: "the Near East (Syria, Phoenicia, and perhaps Mesopotamia) also knew it, but only as a temporary structure" (Weber, 1968: 1226). Weber argued that a city commune depends on non-agricultural settlements that developed commercial relations. They have the following features:

> 1. a fortification 2. a market 3. its own court of law and, at least in part, autonomous law; 4. an associational structure (*Verbands-charakter*) and, connected therewith, 5. at least partial autonomy and autocephaly, which includes administration by authorities in whose appointment the burghers could in some form participate. (Weber, 1968: 1226)

[5] Weber calls this a "sworn confraternization (*Eidverbrüderung: coniuratio*) of the burghers" (Weber, 1968: 1250).

According to him, European cities alone developed these features, unlike Oriental cities. The appearance of the "bourgeois estate," with the right to participate in city politics, was characteristic of the Occidental city (Weber, 1968: 1226).

Asian and Oriental cities, on the other hand, contained only "clan associations, and sometimes also … occupational associations [; they] were the vehicles of organized action (*Verbandshandeln*), but never [a] collective of urban citizens as such" (Weber, 1968: 1233). Muslims never embraced the idea of "communal protection of city-citizen's rights" in Mecca, the holy city of Islam (Weber, 1968: 1233). Eventually, in Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, "up in to the nineteenth century merchant guilds and corporations are the only representatives of bourgeois interests." Military and religious organizations also existed, "but no general corporation of the burghers" (Weber, 1968: 1234). According to Weber, the autonomous administration of the city was specific to the West and Asian cities never knew a court autonomously appointed by burghers who were members of the city-commune (Weber, 1968: 1233).

When analyzing the specific conditions that brought about the uniquely Western type of bureaucracy, Weber investigated, among other factors, the particular features of Occidental feudalism, aspects of which helped pave the way for Western bureaucracy. "[Occidental] feudalism," for Weber, brought forth "stereotyped and fixed relationships between lord and vassal," unlike similar types of feudalism in other regions (Weber, 1968: 1070). For Weber, the reason for this "typification" in Occidental feudalism related to the extent to which "contractual obligations of fealty and loyalty ... were shaped by a code of honor binding upon both parties" (Weber, 1968: 1075). Contractual relations between lord and vassal developed into mutual obligations and rights for both sides. On the other hand, "the Turkish feudal system remained much more prebendal with regard to claims of inheritance, since the power of the Sultan and the *beglerbeg* continued to be largely arbitrary despite all of the rules and regulations" (Weber, 1968: 1075).

For Weber, offices in the West were monopolistically held with respect to legally autonomous sodality rights and the "typification" of the positions of the *ministeriales*. However, the office-holders in the Orient opposed change in the direction taken by the West due to "claims of inheritance" (Weber, 1968: 1075). Whereas the offices, their features, and specific regulations were given priority in the West, persons rather than offices were emphasized in the Orient, and the latter conferred arbitrary power to the office-holder. For Weber:

> In the Islamic Empires, corresponding to their theocratic character, social rank was conferred first of all by the profession of Islamic creed, and office opportunities depended upon religiously controlled education and upon the personal favor of the ruler; this did not give rise to permanent and enduringly effective aristocratic monopolies. (Weber, 1968: 1067)

For Weber, Christianity played a significant role in Europe by eliminating "whatever religious significance … clan ties retained" (Weber, 1968: 1244). On the other hand, he asserts that "Islam never really overcame the divisiveness of Arab tribal and clan ties," and at least "in its early period it remained the religion of a conquering army of tribes and clans" (Weber, 1968: 1244).

Weber also adds Constantinople to his category "Asian cities," even though it was founded as a Roman city and eventually became the capital of the Eastern Roman-Byzantine Empire. For him, religious endowments prevented the rationalization of its politics by giving economic power to the clergy. This remained the case, even though monasteries look like endowments for religious purposes (Weber, 1968: 1095). Surplus money enriched the family of the person who founded the monastery. Hence, "in the guise of a monastery [the city] has sacred protection, *especially* against seizure by secular---that means, patrimonial-bureaucratic---*authorities*" (Weber, 1968: 1095; emphasis in original).

Byzantine noble families, while protecting their assets from arbitrary intervention from Byzantine patrimonial rulers, were strengthening the religious clergy. In the Islamic lands, for Weber, this endowment resulted in an even greater irrationalization of the rulership. Moreover, because Islamic jurists tried their cases through *Kadi-justice*---that is, through "subjective and unpredictable interpretations of the *shari'ah*"--- the strengthening of their social position through religious endowments gave rise to arbitrariness and uncertainty in worldly matters (Weber, 1968: 1096). For him, the subjectivity and unpredictability of Islamic *Kadi-justice* cannot be compared to "the principle *aequum et bonum* in Roman law and the original meaning of 'equity' in English law" (Weber, 1968: 1115). Since professionally-educated Islamic jurists possessed the ability to make their own rulings regarding juridical cases, "the two components of patrimonialism, equally hostile to capitalism, reinforced one another" in the Islamic world (Weber, 1968: 1096).

CONCLUSION

This study has been concerned with German sociologist Max Weber's constructed ideal types to study authority relations in society. These ideal types for Weber are only conceptual tools that are useful to understand social relations. However, they cannot represent reality itself. They always reflect reality only from one point of view as constructed conceptual tools.

Weber evaluates the problem authority with respect to the problem of legitimacy. This means that for Weber there is no authority with a pure power in contrast to some radical thinkers like Karl Marx or Michel Foucault, a contemporary Nietzschean thinker. According to Weber, in terms of the constitution of an authority, there is always a kind of consent behind authority relations between a ruler and ruled.

In order to understand Weberian emphasis on the problem of legitimacy behind domination and authority, this study starts with Weberian sociology. Weber's sociology focuses on "meaning" and individuals' attribution of meaning to their own actions as well as the actions of other people. Hence, Weberian emphasis on the problem of the attribution of meaning to social action is contradictory to Emile Durkheim's emphasis on social whole or Karl Marx's focus on economic relations in terms of approaching society.

Weber constructs four ideal types in order to understand social action: the type of action that people act according to certain goals is rational action. Whereas the ideal type of value oriented action refers to action that an actor is impressed by certain values, affective action for Weber implies feelings of an actor. Fourth ideal type occurs when an actor acts according to customs and conventions, namely "traditions." Rather than rational evaluation, actor acts according to the imitation of "what already have been done."

Weber uses these ideal types of action in order to understand authority and domination types. Each type of action is dominant in a corresponding type of authority: rational-legal, traditional or charismatic types of authority. However, in actual authority relations these ideal types of action are never found in their pure version. They are always found as combinations or mixtures as Weber argues.

As a rational-legal type of authority, bureaucracy depends on impersonal rules and regulations. Relations between a ruler and ruled depend on impersonal, even generally written codes. These codes emphasize on impersonal rules, not the personality of a certain ruler. However, traditional authority which has distinct variations as patriarchalism, patrimonialism, and sultanism, emphasizes the personality of a ruler. Then, ruled people obey this personality rather than certain impersonal, written codes. Sultanism for Weber is an extreme form of traditional authority. Whereas it overemphasizes the personality of a ruler, it supplies him ability to impose his authority and power such as his own personal army.

Weber also uses these ideal types to understand the institutional differences of Western and Eastern civilizations. For Weber, Western civilization depending on Greek, Roman and Medieval era's institutional characteristics improved autonomous institutionalization and mutual contractual relationship between a ruler and ruled. However, Eastern civilization remained in a type of domination and authority in which personalistic and blood relations are strong. In addition, Islam as a world religion remained under the influence of these features of Eastern civilization.

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